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Abstract 
 
Debt may help to manage type II corporate agency conflicts because it is easier for controlling 
shareholders to modify the leverage ratio than to modify their share of capital. A sample of 
112 firms listed on the French stock market over the period 1998-2009 is empirically tested. It 
supports an inverted U-shape relationship between shareholders' ownership and leverage. At 
low levels of ownership, controlling shareholders use more debt in order to inflate their stake 
in capital and to resist unfriendly takeovers attempts. When ownership reaches a certain point, 
controlling shareholders' objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. 
Moreover, financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to reduce the firm's leverage 
ratio. Empirically, it is shown that the inflection point where the sign of the relationship 
between ownership and debt changes is around 40%. Debts may help in curbing private 
appropriation and appears also as a governance variable. 
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Ownership Structure and Debt Level: Empirical Test of a Trade-Off Hypothesis on 
French Firms 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 Recent empirical studies in corporate governance show the prevalence of firms with a 
dominant shareholder (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999; Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio et al., 
2002; Paligorova and Xu, 2009). The fundamental agency problem in firms with a dominant 
shareholder is between controlling shareholders and outside investors. This situation can 
potentially impact a firm’s financing decisions, particularly choices regarding leverage. The 
capital structure literature has largely addressed the relationship between ownership structure 
and debt levels for firms with diffused ownership2. The results of these studies have been mixed 
to some extent. Some studies have suggested that debt is positively related to managers’ equity 
ownership (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Stulz, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988, Berger et al., 1997), 
while other empirical studies have argued for a negative relationship between managerial 
ownership and debt levels (Friend and Lang, 1988). Another line of research has investigated 
how the separation of cash flow rights and control rights affects capital structure. Namely, it 
explores the impact of the outside shareholders’ expropriation risk on debt levels. Here, debt is 
seen as an expropriation device similar to control enhancement mechanisms.   
 Our motivation is different; we investigate the relationship between controlling 
shareholders’ ownership and corporate debt levels. Here also the extent literature shows mixed 
results. Kim and Sorenson (1986), and Agrawal and Mandelker (1987) for American firms; 
Friedman et al. (2003) for Asian firms; Boubaker (2007) for French firms; and Holmen et al. 
(2004) for Swedish firms all find evidence of a positive relationship between debt and control. 
Considering U.S. firms, Nielsen (2006) empirically documented a trade-off between a levered 
financial structure and a weak shareholding. These results suggest that debt will help in 
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expropriation because it gives more power on economic resources. However, the conclusions 
are not unanimously univocal. Faccio et al. (2003) moderate the former idea. In the United 
States, debt seems to play an effective, disciplinary role in governance. In Europe, the 
companies at the bottom of a pyramid, who are seen as more vulnerable, are not particularly 
indebted. On the other hand, in Asia, the situation is different, with strong pressure on the firms 
in the pyramid. However, excessive debt leverage exposes the firm to failure, a situation where 
both public and private earnings for the control group are lost. Holderness et al. (1999) found 
no relationship and show that managerial stock ownership does not increase with debt leverage. 
Grullon et al. (2001) for American firms or Brailsford et al. (2002) for Australian firms 
conclude in favor of a nonlinear complex relation between control and debt, positive at the 
beginning but turning negative at a certain point of control. For the latter, the inside 
shareholders will try to avoid a loss of control linked to a risk of financial distress, so they will 
limit the debt ratio of the controlled firm. Ellul (2008) confirms such a nonlinear relationship in 
a large sample of family firms over many countries. The category of family firms is a subset of 
controlled firms with specific features. Many empirical studies underline the importance of 
control incentives (Anderson et al., 2003, Doukas et al., 2010). Family firms prefer debt 
financing as a non-dilutive security. This paper proposes an empirical study of a self-regulated 
relationship between debt levels and controlling shareholders’ capital ownership. Our 
hypothesis is that this relationship is non-linear. Capital structure decisions depend on the trade-
off between the non-dilution entrenchment needs of controlling shareholders and their goal of 
reducing firm risk. Thus, the relation between controlling shareholders’ ownership and the 
firm’s debt levels may be complex and may have an inverted-U shape. We use a sample of 
firms listed in the French stock market from the SBF 250 index over the period 1998-2009 in 
order to explore this relationship.  
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 The French context provides an especially good platform to conduct our research for 
several reasons. First, as documented by La Porta et al. (1999), the corporate governance 
system in France is typified by a high concentration of ownership, family-controlled firms, the 
presence of family members in management, the relative lack of good protection of outside 
shareholders, and an inefficient law enforcement system. French firms rely more heavily on 
bank financing and their internal funding is decreasing. Domestic institutional environment is 
seen as important to explain the international differences in financing decision (Alves and 
Ferreira, 2011; Cheng and Shui, 2007). By considering only one country we neutralize this 
effect.  
 Our results show that controlling shareholders’ ownership affects a firm’s debt level in 
different ways and support the hypothesis of a trade-off relationship. In particular, we evidence 
to an inverted U-shaped relationship between the ownership stake of the controlling 
shareholders and debt levels. Thus, debt first increases (non-dilution entrenchment effect) and 
then decreases (risk reduction and incentive effect) with the cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholders, since the structure of incentives changes as their holding increases. The non-linear 
relationship confirms that a firm's financing mix depends not only on firm-specific factors but 
also on the cash-flow rights of the controlling shareholders. We are in line with Ellul (2008)’s 
results in a recent similar study, although it was limited to family firms. In a study related to 
French firms, Boubaker (2007) finds a similar non-linear relationship between excess control 
rights and debt levels. Unlike Boubaker’s (2007) work, our paper examines an alternative 
aspect of ownership structure, namely the dominant shareholders’ ownership stake and its 
impact on the firm’s debt ratio. Our paper is also different from recent studies that have 
investigated the impact of a pyramid ownership structure on a firm’s capital structure 
(Paligorova and Xu, 2009; Ellul, 2008; King and Santor, 2008; Manos et al., 2007; Bianco and 
Nicodono, 2006, Faccio and Lang, 2002). These studies have shown that debt facilitates the 
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expropriation of outside shareholders by controlling shareholders who control firms through 
pyramids. However, in this article, we only consider the dominant shareholder ownership of 
cash flow rights and not the separation between ownership and control, and we show that more 
cash flow rights in the hands of the largest shareholder lead to lower leverage. Finally, our 
paper complements recent studies on the endogeneity of ownership structure and addresses the 
endogeneity problem between controlling shareholders’ ownership and firm debt levels. From a 
methodological point of view only few articles implement a simultaneous equation system to 
take into account the reverse causality problem between controlling ownership and leverage 
(Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009; Seifert et al., 2005). In particular, the issue is whether 
dominant shareholder ownership leads to a low debt level, or whether the limited use of debt 
prompts controlling shareholders to maintain their holdings. Thus, debt and large shareholder 
ownership can be seen either as substitute or complementary mechanisms. Our empirical results 
show also an inverse causal relationship from debt to dominant shareholder ownership, which 
suggests that debt may serve as a substitute for capital ownership by the controlling 
shareholders. In a context of dominant control ownership we show that the ownership stake is 
of utmost importance and this decision should interact with leverage.  
 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. A first Section presents the 
hypothesis, the data and the methodology. The next Section presents the empirical results on 
French firm sample. Another Section addresses the endogeneity problem. A conclusion follows. 
  
1-HYPOTHESIS, DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
1.1 Hypothesis 
 Referring simultaneously to the entrenchment effect and to the incentive effect, we state  
that the relation between ownership structure and leverage varies according to the level of 
controlling shareholders’ equity ownership. At low levels of controlling ownership, in contrast 
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to equity financing, debt allows the controlling shareholders to dominate more resources 
without diluting their control stake. However, at high levels of controlling shareholders’ 
ownership, the optimal debt level is reduced. As controlling shareholders’ ownership increases, 
their interests became more aligned with those of outside shareholders, and thus debt is not used 
as a means of expropriating outside shareholders. In this context, controlling shareholders also 
prefer to use less debt to limit their default risk. These two competing effects suggest testing 
empirically the possibility of a non-linear relationship between the level of corporate debt and 
controlling shareholders’ ownership. Formally, we test the following hypothesis: leverage first 
increases as the controlling shareholders’ ownership increases, then, over a certain critical 
level, it decreases as the controlling shareholders’ ownership increases.  
 
1.2 Sample and Data  
Our sample set consisted of firms listed on the French stock market over the period 
1998-2009. These firms belong to the SBF 250 index. We exclude the largest French groups 
belonging to the top CAC 40 Index. Financial companies were excluded from the sample 
because these companies have to comply with very stringent legal requirements. Those firms 
that were subject to mergers or acquisitions, or those that were not listed on the stock exchange 
for a given year, were also eliminated. We also removed firms with negative book equity values 
(Kremp et al., 1999; Lins et al., 2002). Our sample was trimmed by applying a methodology 
similar to that of Kremp et al. (1999). This yielded 1344 firm-year observations on 112 firms 
for the period 1998 through 2009. Firm-level accounting data and market equity values data 
were extracted from the Thomson Financial database. A lot of firm-year observations were 
missing because of mergers, or delisting along the period, or because of data unavailability. We 
collected the ownership structure and voting rights data from Thomson Financial database for 
the former and directly from the financial reports for the latter.  
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1.3 Measuring Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership and Leverage.  
 Three different measures of leverage were considered using either book value or market 
value. Consistent with Antoniou et al. (2008), we calculated book leverage, defined as the ratio 
of book value of total debt divided by total assets (DT_TA). We also considered an alternative 
definition of leverage measured by the total debt to book value of invested capital, i.e equity 
and total debt (DT_CE). The third measure is the market leverage measured as the ratio of book 
value of total debt to the market value of equity plus the book value of total debt (DT_CMV). 
Data limitations confined us to measure debt based only on the book value.  
 Controlling shareholders’ ownership is measured using the same methodology used by 
La Porta et al. (1999). Thus, we collected direct ownership and control rights for the largest 
shareholder. We distinguished between private shareholders, financial institutions, corporations, 
and a state. We looked at the ultimate controlling shareholder when the largest shareholder is a 
state or family members with the same surname (Maury and Pajuste, 2002). When the largest 
shareholder was a financial institution or a corporation, we then identified their owners, the 
owners of these owners, and so on. To measure the ownership stake of the ultimate controlling 
shareholders, we took the product of the cash flow stake along the control chain. We define the 
control stake by using the weakest voting stake in the control path. Then, following Le Maux 
(2002), we split up our sample according to whether firms are dominated by controlling 
minority shareholder, dominated by a controlling majority shareholder, or widely held. A 
controlling majority shareholder owns 40% or more of voting rights alone or with other 
shareholders (family members or other shareholders involved in shareholder agreements)3. A 
controlling minority shareholder holds less than 40% of voting rights but dominates the board 
with members who are affiliated with them. Board members affiliated with a firm’s controlling 
shareholders are managers, family members, banks, insurance companies, employees, state 
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affiliates, and other shareholders involved with the controlling shareholders in a shareholder 
agreement. Thus, the controlling shareholders may be comprised of several allies in a 
controlling coalition. A firm is regarded as being widely held when it is not dominated either by 
a controlling majority shareholder or by a controlling minority shareholder. According to this 
methodology, we calculate the controlling shareholders’ ownership (PERC_CAP) by the 
proportion of cash flow rights held by the controlling shareholders.  
 
1.4 Control variables 
 We also integrate conventional control variables that are usually considered in financial 
literature as influencing the firm’s capital structure. These variables include growth 
opportunities, firm size, the nature of assets, profitability, operational risk, non-debt tax shields, 
and industry classification. In line with Rajan and Zingales (1995), we use the market-to-book 
ratio (MTB) to proxy for growth opportunities. Titman (1984), Bradley et al. (1984) and Titman 
and Wessels (1988) found a negative relation between leverage and other proxies for growth 
opportunities. Myers’ (1977) underinvestment problem suggests a negative relationship 
between growth and debt. We measured firm size using the logarithm of total assets (LOGTA) 
(Faccio et al., 2002). Rajan and Zingales (1995) suggested that firm size may proxy for the 
probability of bankruptcy, which is high in the case of small firms. Several empirical studies 
have found ambiguous results on the relationship between leverage and firm size (Kester, 1986; 
Kim and Sorensen, 1986; Hoshi et al., 1990; Rajan and Zingales, 1995). 
 We used the ratio of tangible assets to total assets for the tangibility attribute 
(TANGIBLE_TA) (Kremp et al., 1999). Rajan and Zingales (1995) asserted that tangible assets 
can be pledged as collateral for loans and can therefore reduce debt agency costs. Myers (1977) 
suggested that the underinvestment problem due to debt financing is weaker for firms with 
more tangible assets. We then expect a positive relation between leverage and tangible assets. 
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The proportion of intangibles goods identified in the balance sheets is a proxy for the 
importance of non-tangibles assets in the firm. This covers assets such as know-how or R&D. It 
may justify the use of equity capital because they are not collateral. To take it into account, we 
use the INTAGIBLE_TA variable. 
 Firm profitability is measured by the ratio of earnings (before interest, taxes, and 
depreciation) to total assets (EBITDA_TA) (Fontaine et al., 1996). We also use the earnings 
ratio after depreciation and amortization (EBIT_TA). Myers and Majluf (1984) suggested that 
more profitable firms use less debt because they have sufficient internal funds. Several 
empirical studies have found a negative relationship between profitability and leverage (Friend 
and Lang, 1988). Another possible explanatory variable is net income volatility. This measure 
is used in a number of empirical papers (Titman and Wessels, 1988; Friend and Lang, 1988). 
An increase in income volatility is considered a serious threat for creditors (Ferri and Jones, 
1979; Bradley et al., 1984; Mehran, 1992). Income volatility should then be negatively related 
to leverage. We calculate income volatility by the standard deviation of a firm’s accounting 
profitability. We use the previous 4 years when estimating standard deviation. This yields the 
two variables RISK_EBIT and RISK_EBITDA, according to the before or after depreciation 
measure of profit.  
The NDTS variable was used to capture the non-debt tax shields argument put forward 
by DeAngelo and Masulis (1980). They stated that firms with a high level of non-debt tax 
shields are expected to receive lower tax benefits associated with leverage and hence will less 
use debt financing. Many empirical studies have corroborated the view that non-debt tax shields 
are negatively associated with leverage (Wald, 1999; Chaplinsky et al., 1993; Brailsford et al., 
2002). We calculate the NDTS variable as the ratio of annual depreciation scaled by total assets. 
The industry feature is also seen as important in explaining corporate leverage. Firms belonging 
to the same industry face similar market conditions and have the same risk characteristics (Scott 
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and Martin, 1975; Ferri and Jones, 1979). Titman and Wessels (1988) suggested that industrial 
companies use less debt because they are exposed to high liquidation costs. Based on the FTSE 
classification, we created dummy variables to control for the effect of sector classification on 
the level of debt ratios. We used four dummy variables to control whether the company belongs 
to industry, consumer goods, services, or new technologies sectors. Annex 1 will present the 
definition of the variables used in the test. 
  
1.5 Methodology. 
 According to the model, we tested the hypothesis of a non-linear relationship between 
leverage ratios and controlling shareholders’ ownership. We used panel data regression 
analysis. In such a framework, the heterogeneity of firms was captured by including firm-
specific effects, which may be either random or fixed. A random-effects model assumes 
independence between error terms and explanatory variables. The Hausman test allows 
validating the exogeneity of the firm-specific effect vis-à-vis the dependent variables 
(Hausman, 1978). If the two null hypotheses are rejected, then a fixed effect modeling will be 
retained. 
 First, to test the impact of controlling shareholders’ ownership on a firm’s leverage 
ratios using the whole sample:  
DT(k)it = β0 + β1 PER_CAPit + β2MTBit + β3LOGTAit + β4 FIXED_ASS_TAit + β5 EBITDA_TAit 
+ β6NDTSit + β7 RISK_EBITDAit + β8 ( sector dummy variables it) + εit,    (1) 
where i denotes the cross-sections and t denotes the time period with i= 1… 112 and t= 1... 12. 
We have yearly observations from 1998 to 2009. DT(k) represents different leverage measures 
(DT_TA, DT_CE, DT_CMV) with k= 1, 2 and 3.
 
Finally, εit  is the normal error term. The same 
model (1) is also estimated on the two sub-samples of (i) firms controlled by majority 
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shareholders and (ii) firms controlled by minority shareholders. Then, we investigated the non-
linear relationship between controlling shareholders’ ownership and the firm’s debt levels. 
Therefore, controlling shareholders’ ownership and its squared value are included into 
regressions, together with control variables:  
DT(k)it = β0 + β1 PER_CAPit + β2 PER_CAPSQit +β3MTBit + β4LOGTAit + β5 
FIXED_ASS_TAit + β6 EBITDA_TAit + β7NDTSit + β8 RISK_EBITDAit + β9 ( sector  dummy 
variables it) + εit,                (2) 
The square of PERC_CAPit is used to test for the quadratic form between debt levels and 
controlling shareholders’ ownership. A negative sign on PERC_CAPSQit will highlight the 
existence of a maximum point, given that PERC_CAPit and DT(k)it must be non-negative by 
construction (Brailsford et al., 2002). Thus, we expect a positive sign on PERC_CAPit.  
2-EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the sample firms. Panel A shows the 
percentage of firms with controlling shareholders and Panel B reports the identity of the 
controlling shareholders. Interestingly, we find that 62.1% of firms are dominated by the 
controlling majority shareholder, and 19.5% of firms are dominated by a controlling minority 
shareholder, at the 40% cut-off level. Only 10.9% of firm-year observations belong to widely 
held firms. This result is in line with Boubaker’s (2007) findings for French sample firms. 
Paligorova and Xu (2009) also documented that among sampled firms in G7 countries, the 
country with the lowest percentage of widely held firms is France. Firms dominated by 
controlling majority shareholders are strongly present in our sample. Panel B of Table 1 shows 
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that family control represents 44% of the firms. Another frequent controlling shareholders 
category is ownership by corporations, which corresponds to 25% of the total number of 
observations. The other ownership categories are governments (2%) and financial institution 
(3%) ownership. Therefore, Panel B shows the predominance of family control in the French 
Midcap context. This corroborates the findings of Boubaker (2007), Faccio and Lang (2002), 
and La Porta et al. (1999). Then, we considered firms with a second-largest shareholder holding 
at least 10% of voting rights who is unaffiliated with the controlling shareholders (neither by 
shareholder agreements nor by family ties). Many studies have highlighted the important role of 
a second blockholder (Pagano and Roell, 1998; Bolton and Von Thadden, 1998; Gomes and 
Novaes, 2001; Bennedsen and Wolfenzon, 2000). A second controlling shareholder will limit 
the opportunistic behavior of controlling shareholders and therefore curb the extraction of 
private benefits of control. Lehman and Weigand (2000) showed that the presence of a second 
shareholder positively affects the profitability of German listed companies. For European firms, 
Faccio and al. (2003) confirmed that the expropriation of minority shareholders is limited when 
controlling shareholders are monitored by a second-largest shareholder. Panel C of Table 1 
shows that firms dominated by controlling shareholders without a second-largest shareholder 
(at a 10% cutoff level) represent 78% of the sample firms. This result confirms the findings of 
Boubaker (2007), La Porta et al. (1999), and Faccio and Lang (2002) for French firms. Finally, 
Panel D of Table 1 describes the industry distribution of our sample firms using FTSE Global 
Classification System, which was adopted by the Paris stock exchange (Euronext Paris) on 
January 1, 2002. Industries in the sample included services, wholesale and retail trade, 
manufacturing, and communication. Most of the firms in the sample are in services (about 
34%), followed by manufacturing industry (24%), consumer goods and trade (about 23%) and 
information technologies (about 20%). Thus, different sectors are well represented in our 
sample firms. Globally, Table 1 shows that for French listed firms, (i) controlling majority 
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shareholders are predominant, (ii) family control of firms appears to be common, and (iii) the 
monitoring role of the second-largest shareholder is limited.  
 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 Table 2 reports descriptive statistics of the cash flow rights and voting rights of the 
controlling group, as well as the wedge ratio measured by the ratio of the cash flow rights to the 
voting rights of the largest shareholder. We document that, on average, the controlling 
shareholders have 51.5% of the cash flow rights and 61.1% of the control rights (Panel A). 
Thus, the controlling shareholders own a significant fraction of the cash flow rights, and voting 
ownership is higher than cash flow ownership. As shown by Boubaker (2007) and Faccio and 
Lang (2002), our results indicate that ownership and control are highly concentrated in France. 
It can be seen that the controlling shareholders’ average ratio of cash flow to voting rights is 
89.9%. According to Faccio and Lang (2002)’s study examining Western European countries, 
the separation of ownership and control is highest in France. Various devices are used by 
controlling shareholders, such as pyramids, cross-holding, and dual class shares, to create 
discrepancies between ownership and control rights. In particular, pyramids are typical 
mechanisms of control in France (Boubaker, 2007) and in many other countries (Ellul, 2008). 
Thus, controlling shareholders are able to dominate firms while owning a small fraction of their 
capital equity. Our sample covers a large scale of capital stake held by a controlling/not 
controlling shareholder along the 0 to 100% values (see panel B).   
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 Leverage measures for the entire sample are analyzed according the stake of equity held 
by a controlling shareholder. For the full sample, the debt-to-assets ratio (DT_TA) shows a 
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mean value of 22.0%. The average value of the leverage compared to the book value of 
employed capital (DT_CE) is 36.7%. The average value of the market leverage value 
(DT_CMV) is 27.2%. Moreover, the mean size of the sample firms, measured by the logarithm 
of total assets, is 2.88. The mean profitability (EBIT_TA) of the sample firms is 7.0% of total 
assets. The average scaled value of tangible fixed assets is 19.7% and the mean ratio of 
intangible assets is roughly equivalent (19.9%). The standard deviation of the profitability, 
which measures the firm’s risk, is around 3.5%, either looking at EBITDA or EBIT. On average, 
non-debt tax shields account for 4.9% of total assets. Descriptive statistics for the two sub-
samples of firms give also interesting features. They outline that firms dominated by controlling 
majority shareholders have, on average, lower leverage, whether measured in book value or in 
market value, than firms dominated by controlling minority shareholders. Moreover, we find 
that controlling majority shareholders hold, on average more than 60% of cash flow rights. On 
the other hand, the controlling minority shareholders hold, on average, no more than 30% of 
cash flow rights to influence the firm’s decisions. This result suggests different ownership and 
control structures as proposed by Bebchuk et al. (2000). In a controlling majority structure, the 
controlling shareholders usually hold a large fraction of cash flow rights. Thus, their interests 
are more aligned with those of outside shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The rationale 
of a controlling minority permits controlling shareholders to dominate a firm’s decisions while 
holding a smaller capital stake. Hence, they have the incentive to extract valuable private 
benefits of control (La Porta and al., 1999). Different tests of differences between firms 
dominated by controlling majority shareholders and firms controlled by minority shareholders 
were performed (see Table3). With respect to book and market values of leverage, univariate 
tests reveal that the difference in debt ratios between the two types of firm control is not 
significant at conventional confidence levels. This finding suggests that firms dominated by 
controlling minority shareholders do not appear to use debt differently than their counterparts. 
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Considering now the sub-samples of family-controlled firms and corporate-controlled firms we 
show a significant difference in their debt leverage. Family-controlled firms will significantly 
use less debt than corporate-controlled firms (see Table 3). This underlines a specificity for 
family firms identified by others (King and Santor, 2008; Ellul, 2008; Doukas et al. 2010) 
 
INSERT HERE TABLE 3 
 
 In Table 4 we examine the firm leverage as controlling shareholders’ ownership 
increases. The relationship between debt leverage and the ownership stake of controlling 
shareholders evidence some inverted-Ushape. Thus, controlling shareholders’ ownership 
exhibits a nonlinear pattern with leverage, particularly if we consider DT_CE and DR_CMV 
variables. Debt ratio measured in book value increases as controlling shareholders’ ownership 
increases. However, after reaching a maximum around the 50% stake, debt begins to decrease 
as controlling shareholders’ ownership increases. We find no readily apparent relation between 
controlling shareholders’ ownership and debt ratio measured using total assets (DT_TA).   
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
 
2.2 Multivariate Analysis  
 A correlation analysis of the independent variables was first performed.. To check 
whether variables are collinear, we used a VIF test. The results of our VIF tests are 
considerably lower than 3. Thus, multicollinearity among the independent variables should not 
be seen as a problem. We use panel regression only with individual effect and no time effect. A 
preliminary analysis of variance shows non-significant time effect either looking at the leverage 
or the ownership stake variable. It is known that these variables are generally stable through 
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time. When performing the panel analysis we use both random and fixed firm effects. Fixed 
firm effect are redundant with the dummy sector variables. This is why we performeing the 
Hausman test we compare model (1) without using the sector dummies. In every case the 
random firm effect is selected4.  
 
 Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership and Leverage.  
First, we explored the existence of a linear relation between firm debt level and 
controlling shareholders’ ownership for the whole sample. Table 5 presents the regression 
results that link cash flow rights in the hands of the controlling shareholders with book and 
market measures of leverage. The coefficient on the cash flow rights of the controlling 
shareholders (PER_CAP) is negative and not significant for the M1, M2, and M3 regressions. 
These results does not seem to support the view that higher debt levels may lead to default and 
thus that controlling shareholders are more likely to use less debt as their ownership share 
increases. Control variables are largely significant with the expected sign: higher size means 
higher leverage, large collateral helps debt, strong tax shield facility also favors leverage. 
However the sign of the MTB variable is not clear and higher operational risk does not seem to 
influence the level of leverage. 
 
INSERT HERE TABLE 5 
  
Next, we investigated the effects of the cash flow rights of the controlling shareholders on a 
corporate capital structure by splitting up the sample according to whether firms are dominated 
by controlling majority shareholders5 (M4, M5, M6) or by controlling minority shareholders 
(M7, M8, M9). Table 6 presents the results of our tests. For firms dominated by controlling 
minority shareholders, the coefficients of PERC_CAP are negative but insignificant. However, 
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for firms dominated by controlling majority shareholders, the coefficients of PERC_CAP are 
negative and significant. This result suggests that when controlling shareholders hold a majority 
ownership stake, the relation between firm leverage and ownership is negative and significant. 
A potential explanation for the result is that controlling shareholders owning a large part of a 
firm’s capital are exposed to a high risk level due to their undiversified financial investment. 
Therefore, they choose to limit the firm’s risk by reducing the use of debt. Higher debt ratios 
are more likely to lead to default, so controlling majority shareholders are less prone to using 
debt financing to reduce the risk of losing their wealth in the case of bankruptcy. On the other 
hand, this finding is also consistent with the positive incentive effects associated with cash flow 
ownership by controlling shareholders (La Porta et al., 2002). Nevertheless, for firms 
dominated by controlling minority shareholders, the relationship is not significant. Thus, the 
positive incentive effect linked to increased cash flow rights of the largest shareholder is less 
relevant for firms with controlling minority shareholders. Indeed, in contrast to dominant 
majority shareholders, controlling minority shareholders are motivated to expropriate outside 
shareholders, as they bear only a small fraction of losses but reap all of the private benefits of 
control (Cronqvist and Nilsson, 2003). For the two sub-samples of firms, the coefficients on 
control variables are significant overall and have the expected signs (except for the coefficients 
of the firm risk and growth opportunities variables). It is worth noticing from Table 6 that 
conclusions are different depending on whether we consider firms dominated by controlling 
minority shareholders or by controlling majority shareholders. Because of these conflicting 
results, we need to introduce a non-linear relationship between debt level and controlling 
shareholders’ ownership.  
 
INSERT HERE TABLE 6 
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 Evidence of a Non-Linear Relationship.  
Our univariate analysis suggests that the relation between leverage and controlling 
shareholders’ ownership is potentially non-monotonic. Thus, we examined the possibility of a 
non-linear relationship between leverage ratios and controlling shareholders’ ownership. Table 
7 presents the results of models where debt ratios are regressed against controlling 
shareholders’ ownership, the square of controlling shareholders’ ownership, and control 
variables. (M10, M11, M12). The coefficients of PERC_CAP and PERC_CAPSQ variables 
present the expected signs and are statistically strongly significant. The coefficient of 
PERC_CAP is positive and that of PERC_CAPSQ is negative. These negative coefficients 
highlight a nonlinear relation between leverage and controlling shareholders’ ownership. The 
sign of PERC_CAP, which was not significant in the linear form, turns now significant when 
we introduce PERC_CAPSQ into the regressions. This result suggests that debt level increases 
with controlling shareholders’ ownership when they hold a small proportion of a firm’s capital. 
The negative value of PERC_CAPSQ shows that this relation changes between high and low 
levels of capital ownership. Thus, debt increases as controlling shareholders’ ownership 
increases, then, after a certain critical level, debt decreases with the percentage of capital held 
by controlling shareholders. When the level of their ownership is low, the controlling 
shareholders use leverage for entrenchment motives (Ellul, 2008). Thus, instead of outside 
equity finance, controlling shareholders choose debt financing due to its non-dilutive 
entrenchment effect. This effect is particularly strong when controlling shareholders hold a 
small fraction of cash flow rights but have significant control rights. However, when the cash 
flow rights of the controlling shareholders are high, the dominant shareholder would like to 
reduce debt usage in order to limit the risk of financial distress that may lead to the loss of their 
wealth, which is heavily invested in the controlled firm (Friend and Lang, 1988). In addition, 
this result is consistent with the incentive effects of the cash flow rights of the controlling 
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shareholders documented by La Porta et al. (2002). They argue that the positive incentive 
effects increase with the share of cash flow rights in the hands of the largest shareholder. As 
controlling shareholders’ ownership increases, he has fewer incentives to undertake costly 
expropriation activities since he internalizes the costs of such actions. Thus, controlling 
shareholders with a large share of cash flow rights are less likely to rely on debt financing to 
expropriate outside shareholders6. The empirical results confirm our hypothesis that states 
that the relation between leverage and controlling shareholders’ ownership is non-linear. We 
find that the relative levels of importance of the incentive effect, the risk-reduction effect, and 
the entrenchment effect balance at a given point which is the maximum of the inverted U-shape 
curve. Controlling shareholders with a small stake (less than 40%) use more debt for 
entrenchment purposes. Thus, the entrenchment effect sets and dominates, resulting in severe 
agency problems between controlling shareholders and outside shareholders. With significant 
power and influence while holding a low stake of capital, controlling minority shareholders are 
able to extract important private benefits of control at the expense of non-controlling 
shareholders. Then, above a certain level of ownership (more than 40 to 50%), dominant 
shareholders have less incentive to expropriate outside shareholders and to engage in non-
maximizing behavior due to the convergence between controlling shareholders’ and outside 
investors’ interests. As a result, the controlling majority shareholders are less prone to use debt 
in order to entrench themselves further. They are more interested in value maximization rather 
than in expropriating minority shareholders. Furthermore, because a high level of debt 
financing increases the risk of bankruptcy, controlling shareholders holding a significant 
fraction of a firm’s capital avoid increasing debt in order to prevent financial distress because 
such distress could lead to a loss of their wealth, which is highly invested in the firm they 
control. Controlling majority shareholders fear the transfer of control after debt default; as a 
result, they prefer to moderate indebtedness.   
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 INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
 
The inflection point of the quadratic relation is obtained by evaluating the first 
derivative and setting it equal to zero (Brailsford et al., 2002; Anderson and Reeb, 2003). The 
estimates of the turning points are in th e40 to 50% ownership range. Therefore, for French 
firms, debt decreases with the controlling shareholders’ ownership when they hold more than 
40% of the firm’s equity. Globally, this result suggests that the debt is positively linked to the 
controlling shareholders’ ownership when they generally hold less than 40% of a firm’s cash 
flow rights. According to our definition of controlling shareholders’ categories, our results 
show that firms dominated by controlling minority shareholders are associated with high debt 
levels relative to firms with controlling majority shareholders.  
 Turning to the control variables, we find that the most of them have statistically 
significant explanatory power and that their signs are consistent with predictions. The NDTS 
variable, which proxies for a non-debt tax shield, has a positive and significant coefficient. 
Higher profitability is associated with a lower leverage level. This finding is consistent with the 
pecking-order hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) and the empirical results of Titman and 
Wessels (1988), Friend and Lang, (1988) and Wald (1995). The coefficient of the firm risk 
variable is not significant. The result does not support the view that firms with higher earnings 
volatility use less debt due to higher bankruptcy risks. The estimated coefficient of firm size is 
positive and statistically significant. This is consistent with the argument that states that firm 
size serves as an inverse proxy for the probability of bankruptcy, which implies that larger firms 
should be more highly levered. The positive impact of size on leverage is consistent with the 
results of many empirical studies (Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Booth et al., 2001; Frank and 
Goyal, 2002). The coefficient of the tangible fixed asset variable is positive and significant. 
Thus, firms use tangible assets as collateral when negotiating borrowing. This is consistent with 
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the findings of Zingales (1995); Kremp et al. (1999); Frank and Goyal (2002). The coefficient 
on the MTB variable, which proxies for growth opportunities, is negative in models M10 and 
M11 and significant. Therefore, firms with growth opportunities use less debt financing 
(Bradley et al., 1984; Titman and Wessel, 1988). However it is negative in the estimates of 
model M12 
 
3-ENDOGENEITY AND ROBUSTNESS 
3.1 Endogeneity between Controlling Shareholders’ Ownership and Debt Financing 
 Our previous empirical analysis explores the impact of controlling shareholders’ 
ownership on debt levels and considers dominant shareholder ownership to be exogenous. 
Demstez (1983) argued that the ownership structure is an endogenous variable determined by 
the decisions taken by shareholders and transactions on the stock market. Several studies 
focusing on the relationship between ownership structure and performance highlight the 
endogeneity of a firm’s ownership structure. Our above results ignore a possible interaction 
between large shareholder ownership and debt financing. Ownership structure may not affect 
the firm’s leverage, but it can be affected by it. In particular, the issue is whether controlling 
shareholders’ ownership leads to a low debt level or whether low debt levels prompt families to 
maintain their holdings.  
 A large body of literature finds a positive or negative impact of ownership structure on a 
firm’s debt levels. However, these studies overlook the inverse causality effect of capital 
structure on ownership structure. Ignoring this reverse causality may lead to a simultaneity bias. 
Debt level can be a determinant of controlling shareholders’ ownership. According to Jensen 
and Meckling (1976), debt financing reduces the use of external equity capital, thereby 
increasing the level of managerial ownership. Debt may also negatively affect dominant 
shareholder ownership. High indebtedness increases the bankruptcy risk. This may constrain 
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large shareholders to reduce their holding in order to limit losses of their wealth in the case of 
bankruptcy. Debt and controlling shareholders’ ownership are somehow related in different 
ways. Thus, whether these mechanisms are substitute or complementary is ultimately an 
empirical question.   
 Here, we model dominant shareholder ownership and leverage as simultaneously 
determined. Therefore, we estimate a system of simultaneous equations highlighting the 
interaction between debt leverage and controlling shareholders’ ownership (Seifert et al. 2005; 
Bhattacharya and Graham, 2009). The simultaneous equations model is defined by equations 
(3)-(4), in which controlling shareholders’ ownership (PERC_CAP) and leverage (DT(k)) are 
endogenous variables. The order and the rank conditions were satisfied; therefore, the equation 
system was identified.  
DT(k)it = β0 + β1 PER_CAPit + β2 PER_CAPSQit +β3MTBit + β4LOGTAit + β5 
FIXED_ASS_TAit + β6 EBITDA_TAit + β7NDTSit + β8 RISK_EBITDAit + β9 ( sector  dummy 
variables it) + εit,                     (3) 
PERC_CAPit = α0+α1 DT(k) it +α2 MTBit+α3LOGTAit+α4INTANGIBLE_TAit+ α5RISK_EBITit 
α6MAT_DEBTit+α7C_FAMit+ α8(sector dummies) it + vit                     (4) 
  
Equation (3) has been analyzed above. Equation (4) describes a reverse causality in the 
relationship between leverage and ownership structure; here, controlling shareholders’ 
ownership is treated as a dependant variable. Like most of the previous papers related to 
ownership structure, we include operational risk (RISK_EBIT), debt, firm size (LOGTA), and 
research and development (INTANGIBLE_TA) as determinants of ownership structure. We 
expect a negative relationship between firm size and controlling shareholders’ ownership 
(Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). Indeed, large firms tend to issue more shares than do smaller ones. 
We predict dominant shareholder ownership to be a negative function of risk. Indeed, high 
levels of risk may lead controlling shareholders to diversify their portfolios. Mahrt-Smith 
(2005) suggested that firms that need to invest for the long term should have more dispersed 
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ownership. Research and development expenses and intangible assets show the presence of 
long-term firm investment, which is negatively related to ownership structure. Ellul (2008) 
argued that various owner categories could impact a firm’s financing decisions in different 
ways. In particular, family controlling shareholders are more likely to be concerned with 
maintaining a high level of control than institutional blockholders are. In this regard, family 
firms will rely heavily on debt to maintain control of their firms. Therefore, we investigate the 
specificity of family firms through a dummy variable C_FAM.  
Preliminary estimates of univariate equation (4) show that debt variable is non-
significant to explain the percentage of capital held by the controlling shareholder. The 
estimates of equation (4) in a simultaneous panel system suggest that dominant shareholders are 
more likely to reduce their share of cash flow rights when debt financing is increased (see Table 
8). A high level of debt increases the probability of default, which may lead the controlling 
shareholders to lower their ownership stake. This inverse causal relation from debt to 
controlling shareholders’ ownership also suggests that debt may serve as a substitute 
mechanism for dominant shareholder ownership. Lower cash flow rights held by controlling 
shareholders increase their willingness to expropriate outside shareholders. Indeed, this 
exacerbates the conflict between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Debt financing 
appears as a means of enhancing dominant shareholder control and thus enables dominant 
shareholders to further entrench themselves (Ellul, 2008).    
 Among the exogenous variables in controlling shareholders’ ownership equation, Table 
8 shows that size is negatively and significantly related to dominant shareholder ownership. 
Controlling shareholders reduce their share of cash flow rights when the controlled firm 
becomes larger. This result suggests significant ownership dispersion for large firms. Our 
findings are in line with those of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Crespi and Cladera (1998), and 
Harvey et al. (2004). Furthermore, the coefficient on the risk variable is negatively and weakly 
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linked to the percentage of equity held by the controlling shareholders. This result indicates that 
dominant shareholders limit their capital ownership when the risk is high. Indeed, they prefer to 
hold a diversified portfolio to mitigate the loss of their wealth when financial distress occurs. 
The coefficient on the R&D and intangible variable has a negative and significant impact on the 
cash flow rights of controlling shareholders. Our result is consistent with the Mahrt-Smith 
(2005) argument that the share of cash flow rights is reduced when the firm has long-term 
investments. This may lead managers to reduce their opportunistic behavior in order to protect 
their future rents.  
 In debt equation (3), the results from 2SLS panel system are totally consistent with our 
prior univariate panel OLS results. Indeed, the relation between family ownership and debt 
levels remains non-linear when we use a model of simultaneous equations. All of the 
exogenous variables (with the exception of the operational risk RISK_EBITDA) are significant 
and have the same previous signs.  
 
INSERT HERE TABLE 8 
 
3.2 The Influence of Outside Shareholders  
 We analyzed the effect of an outside blockholder in the relationship between controlling 
shareholders’ ownership and firm leverage. We used a dummy variable, BLOC_EXT, to 
identify an outside blockholder, defined as an entity holding at least 10% of a firm’s shares that 
is not related to the controlling group. Other large blockholders may have strong incentives to 
monitor the controlling shareholders by keeping them from expropriating outside shareholders 
(La Porta et al., 1999). To consider what effect the presence of a second large shareholder has 
on our results, we re-estimate the regressions of Table 7, this time including outside 
blockholders as a dummy variable.  
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 The coefficient of the PERC_CAP and the PERC_CAPSQ variables is still the same. In 
each of these regressions, the coefficient of the BLOC_EXT variable is not statistically 
significant. This result suggests that the presence of an outside blockholder has no effect on the 
firm’s debt financing decisions.  It does not interfere in the relationship regarding self-
regulation over leverage levels or in the nonlinearity of the relationship between controlling 
shareholders’ ownership and debt levels. Our results are consistent with the findings of 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Maury and Pajuste (2002), which disagree with the argument 
for a positive monitoring role by an outside shareholder. One potential explanation of our 
results is that an outside blockholder may have incentives to collude with the controlling 
shareholders to share the private benefits of control (Faccio and Lang, 2001). From Table 9, it 
is confirmed that the relation between controlling shareholders’ ownership and firm leverage is 
non-linear. Thus, our results are robust after controlling for outside blockholders.  
 
INSERT TABLE 9 HERE 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 This article examines the relationship between ownership structure and debt policy. 
Using a sample of 112 French listed firms over the period 1998-2009, our results indicate a 
non-linear, inverted-U-shaped relationship between the level of controlling shareholders’ 
ownership and leverage. Endogeneity was taken into account in the empirical test with a system 
of simultaneous equations. Our findings are similar to those reported by Ellul (2008) and to the 
non-linear relationship found by Agca and Mansi (2008). 
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 Controlling shareholders’ ownership affects indebtedness in different ways. At low 
levels of controlling shareholders’ ownership, the entrenchment effect dominates and results in 
a positive relation between controlling shareholders’ ownership and leverage. This suggests that 
controlling shareholders holding a small fraction of a firm’s equity will use more debt to inflate 
their power and protect themselves. When controlling shareholders’ ownership reaches a certain 
point, controlling shareholders’ objectives further converge with those of outside shareholders. 
Thus, the fear of financial distress will prompt controlling shareholders to lower indebtedness. 
This raises questions on how the ownership structure influences a firm’s financing decisions in 
French listed firms. The behavior of the banker, which was considered to be passive in our 
setting, can be investigated in a more dynamic framework in the future.  
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Annex. Definition of Variables  
Variable  Definition Measure  
DT_TA Book value  Book value of total debt divided by 
total assets 
DT_CE Book value of debt  Book value of total debt divided by 
the book value of total debt plus the 
book value of total equity.  
DTCMV Market value of debt  Book value of total debt divided by 
the book value of total debt plus the 
market value of total equity.  
PERC_CAP Controlling shareholder 
ownership  
Proportion of cash flow rights held 
by controlling shareholders.  
BLOC_EXT Another large shareholder  
present  
Dummy variable equals 1 if the 
second largest shareholder hold 10% 
and more of the voting rights; 0 
otherwise.  
PERC_VOTE Controlling shareholder 
voting rights 
Proportion of voting rights held by 
controlling shareholders 
 
NDTS 
 
Non debt tax shield 
Ratio of depreciation to total assets. 
WEDGE Gap between cash flow and 
voting rights held by the 
controlling shareholder 
Ratio of cash flow rights over voting 
rights 
EBITDA_TA Profitability  before 
depreciation 
Ratio of EBITDA to total assets. 
EBIT_TA Profitability after 
depreciation  
Ratio of EBIT to total assets. 
RISK_EBITDA Operational Risk Standard deviation of firm’s 
EBITDA_TA over the 4 previous 
years  
RISK_EBIT Operational Risk The standard deviation of firm’s 
EBIT_TA over the 4 previous years  
LOGTA Firm Size  Logarithm of the book value of total 
assets.  
FIXED_ASS_TA Collaterals   Ratio of tangible fixed assets 
(Property, plant and equipment) to 
total assets. 
MATU_DEBT Debt maturity Ratio of long term (above 1 year) 
financial debt to total financial debt 
MTB Growth opportunities  Ratio of market value of equity to 
equity book value. 
TYPE_CONT Type of control Integer: (0) Dispersed ownership, (1) 
minor (below 40%) controller, (2) 
major controller (above (40%) 
IDENT_CONT Identity of the controller Integer: (3) Family, (2) corporate, 
(1) Government, (0) financial 
institution 
INTANGIBLE_TA Intangible, know-how and 
R&D 
Ratio of intangible assets over total 
assets 
INDUST  Industry Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm 
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belongs to industry; 0 otherwise. 
CONS_GOODS consumer goods Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm 
belongs to consumer goods; 0 
otherwise. 
SERV Services  Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm 
belongs to services; 0 otherwise. 
TECH_INFO New technologies  Dummy variable equals 1 if the firm 
belongs to new technologies; 0 
otherwise. 
 
TABLE 1.  Sample Description. 
Characteristics of firms over the period 1998-2009. The sample consists of 112 French listed 
firm SBF 250 index after eliminating large cap and financial firms, % is total of available firm-
year observations available over the total panel.  
 N (firm-year 
observations) 
Proportion (%) 
Panel A. Type of control    
Widely held 146 10.9 
Controlling minority  shareholders   262 19.5 
Controlling majority shareholders   835 62.1 
Total  1233  
Panel B. Identity of controlling shareholders     
Financial institutions  40 3.0 
Government 27 2.0 
Corporations   333 24.8 
Family  586 43.6 
Total  986  
Panel C. Second large shareholder    
Second large shareholder is present 97 21.6 
Second large shareholder is not  present 352 78.4 
Total  449  
Panel D. Sector data    
Industry 312 24.2 
Cons goods and Trade 289 22.5 
Services  435 33.8 
Information Technology  251 19.5 
Total 1287  
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TABLE 2.  Summary statistics of Ownership  
(See Annex 1 for variable definitions; DT_CE and DT_CMV have been filtered out to eliminate 
negative values and outliers) 
PanelA. Ownership     
 Mean Std. deviation N 
PER_CAP  0.515 0.237 1212 
PERC_VOTE  0.611 0.196 370 
WEDGE  0.899 0.199 370 
Panel B. Ownership frequency    
 N %  
PERC_CAP<20% 139 11.5  
20%<PERC_CAP<40% 239 19.7  
40%<PERC_CAP<50% 144 11.9  
50%<PERC_CAP<60% 178 14.7  
60%<PERC_CAP<70% 218 18.0  
70%<PERC_CAP<80% 187 15.4  
PERC_CAP>80% 108 8.9  
Panel C Debt Leverage    
 Mean Std. deviation N 
DT_TA 0.220 0.152 1217 
DT_CE 0.367 0.230 1201 
DT_CMV 0.272 0.222 1201 
.  
 
TABLE 3. Univariate test of leverage levels in sub-samples 
DT_TA: ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt divide by total 
employed capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by total debt and 
equity capital using stock market value, p-value is probability of significant difference between 
values of the variables 
 
Debt 
leverage 
Majority 
control 
Minority 
control 
p-value Family Corporate p-value 
DT_TA 0.212 0.248 0.15 0.197 0.226 0.00 
DT_CE 0.361 0.386 0.12 0.336 0.383 0.00 
DT_CMV 0.267 0.281 0.35 0.243 0.287 0.00 
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TABLE 4. Leverage levels based on the level of controlling shareholders ownership. 
This table provides leverage levels in the sample firms based on the level of controlling 
shareholders ownership. PERC_CAP represents the fraction equity holdings of controlling 
shareholder, DT_TA: ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt 
divide by total employed capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by 
total debt and equity capital using stock market value.  
 
 
Controlling shareholders 
ownership   
  
DT_TA  
  
DT_CE  
 
DT_CMV 
PERC_CAP<20% 0.255 0.370 0.285 
20%<PERC_CAP<40% 0.234 0.397 0.293 
40%<PERC_CAP<50% 0.209 0.365 0.234 
50%<PERC_CAP<60% 0.254 0.425 0.327 
60%<PERC_CAP<70% 0.195 0.330 0.244 
70%<PERC_CAP<80% 0.217 0.372 0.292 
PERC_CAP>80% 0.155 0.251 0.185 
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TABLE 5. Leverage and controlling shareholders’ ownership 
The table presents panel estimates of models relating debt ratios to controlling shareholders 
ownership. The sample contains 112 French listed firms over the period 1998-2009. DT_TA: 
ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt divide by total employed 
capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by total debt and equity 
capital using stock market value, PERC_CAP: proportion of cash flow rights held by 
controlling shareholder, NDTS: ratio of depreciation to total assets. EBITDA_TA: ratio of 
EBITDA to total assets, LOGTA: logarithm of the book value of total assets, RISK_EBITDA: 
standard deviation of firm’s profitability, FIXED_ASS_TA: ratio of fixed assets to total assets, 
MTB: market value of shares divided by equity book value. Sector dummy variable defined by 
FTSE classification are included into regressions but are not reported here, panel is estimated 
using individual effect only, p-values are between parentheses, a, b, c indicates significance at 
the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level. The Hausman test compares random individual effects to 
fixed individual effects.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependant variable 
Independent variable  DT_TA DT_CE DT_CMV 
Model M1 M2 M3 
PERC_CAP -0.0299 
(0.12) 
-0.0322 
(0.28) 
-0.0291 
(0.35) 
MTB 0.0020 
(0.00)a 
0.0044 
(0.00)a 
-0.0027 
(0.00)a 
LOGTA 0.1255 
(0.00)a 
0.1653 
(0.00)a 
0.1761 
(0.00)a 
FIXED_ASS_TA 0.1781 
(0.00)a 
0.1807 
(0.00)a 
0.1369 
(0.06)b 
EBITDA_TA -0.3260 
(0.00)a 
-0.5475 
(0.00)a 
-0.6811 
(0.00)a 
NDTS 0.2242 
(0.00) 
0.3146 
(0.01)a 
0.4999 
(0.00)a 
RISK_EBITDA 0.1540 
(0.11) 
0.4038 
(0.00)a 
0.1281 
(0.41) 
Dummy sector  Sign Sign Sign 
R2 0.79 0.80 0.75 
Hausman Test 
(fixed/random effect) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
0.00 
(1.00) 
0 
(1.00) 
N 1057 1050 1055 
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TABLE 6. Regression results on the relationship between leverage and controlling 
shareholders’ ownership by type of control. 
The table presents panel estimates of models relating debt ratios to controlling shareholders 
ownership. Panel are estimated through two sub-samples of major controlling shareholder with 
a stake of capital above 40% and minor controlling blockholder holding a stake of capital below 
40%. The sample contains 112 French listed firms over the period 1998-2009. DT_TA: ratio of 
financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt divide by total employed capital 
using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by total debt and equity capital 
using stock market value, PERC_CAP: proportion of cash flow rights held by controlling 
shareholder, NDTS: ratio of depreciation to total assets. EBITDA_TA: ratio of EBITDA to total 
assets, LOGTA: logarithm of the book value of total assets, RISK_EBITDA: standard deviation 
of firm’s profitability, FIXED_ASS_TA: ratio of fixed assets to total assets, MTB: market value 
of shares divided by equity book value. Sector dummy variable defined by FTSE classification 
are included into regressions but are not reported here, panel is estimated using individual effect 
only, p-values are between parentheses, a, b, c indicates significance at the 1% level, 5% level 
and 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
Independent 
variables   
Dependant variable 
 Type of control  
 Controlling majority shareholders  Controlling minority shareholders  
Model M4 M5 M6 M7 M8 M9 
 DT_TA DT_CE DT_CMV DT_TA DT_CE DT_CMV 
PERC_CAP -0.1505 
(0.00)a 
-0.2561 
(0.00)a 
-0.2526 
(0.00)a 
-0.1082 
(0.15) 
-0.0871 
(0.45) 
-0.1412 
(0.29) 
MTB 0.0067 
(0.00)a 
0.0153 
(0.00)a 
-0.0163 
(0.00)a 
0.0015 
(0.00)a 
0.0031 
(0.00)a 
-0.0013 
(0.12) 
LOGTA 0.1297 
(0.00)a 
0.1911 
(0.00)a 
0.1497 
(0.00)a 
0.1130 
(0.00)a 
0.1737 
(0.00)a 
0.1570 
(0.00)a 
FIXED_ASS_TA 0.1686 
(0.00)a 
0.1453 
(0.00)a 
0.0784 
(0.28) 
0.0419 
(0.77) 
-0.0237 
(0.90) 
0.1720 
(0.36) 
EBITDA_TA -0.4813 
(0.00)a 
-0.7427 
(0.00)a 
-0.8604 
(0.00)a 
-0.2084 
(0.03)b 
-0.4691 
(0.00)a 
-0.2829 
(0.09)c 
NDTS 0.6541 
(0.00)a 
1.0372 
(0.00)a 
1.0897 
(0.00)a 
-0.2226 
(0.03)b 
-0.2898 
(0.07)c 
-0.0651 
(0.73)a 
RISK_EBITDA 0.0892 
(0.39) 
0.4275 
(0.01)a 
0.0642 
(0.71) 
-0.1035 
(0.65) 
-0.0653 
(0.84) 
0.3156 
(0.42) 
Dummy sector  Non Sign Non Sign Non Sign Non Sign Non Sign Non Sign 
R2 0.85 0.85 0.82 0.80 0.79 0.64 
N 750 749 748 213 213 213 
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Table 7.The non-linear relationship between controlling shareholders’ ownership and 
debt levels  
The table presents panel estimates of models relating debt ratios to controlling shareholders 
ownership. The sample contains 112 French listed firms over the period 1998-2009. DT_TA: 
ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt divide by total employed 
capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by total debt and equity 
capital using stock market value, PERC_CAP: proportion of cash flow rights held by 
controlling shareholder, PERC_CAPSQ: squared value of PERC_CAP, NDTS: ratio of 
depreciation to total assets. EBITDA_TA: ratio of EBITDA to total assets, LOGTA: logarithm 
of the book value of total assets, RISK_EBITDA: standard deviation of firm’s profitability, 
FIXED_ASS_TA: ratio of fixed assets to total assets, MTB: market value of shares divided by 
equity book value. Sector dummy variable defined by FTSE classification are included into 
regressions but are not reported here, panel is estimated using individual effect only, p-values 
are between parentheses, a, b, c indicates significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Independent variables   Dependent variable 
Model M10 M11 M12 
 DT_TA DT_CE DT_CMV 
PERC_CAP 0.1783 
(0.00)a 
0.5242 
(0.00)a 
0.3994 
(0.00)a 
PERC_CAPSQ -0.2078 
(0.00)a 
-0.5526 
(0.00)a 
-0.4281 
(0.00)a 
MTB 0.0020 
(0.00)a 
0.0044 
(0.00)a 
-0.0028 
(0.00)a 
LOGTA 0.1321 
(0.00)a 
0.1812 
(0.00)a 
0.1872 
(0.00)a 
FIXED_ASS_TA 0.1757 
(0.00)a 
0.1845 
(0.00)a 
0.1339 
(0.06)c 
EBITDA_TA -0.3299 
(0.00)a 
-0.5566 
(0.00)a 
-0.6932 
(0.00)a 
NDTS 0.2265 
(0.00)a 
0.2547 
(0.03)b 
0.5036 
(0.00)b 
RISK_EBITDA 0.1680 
(0.00)a 
0.4346 
(0.00)a 
0.1545 
(0.32)a 
Dummy sector  Sign Sign Sign 
R2 0.80 0.81 0.76 
N 1057 1050 1055 
Inflection point (%) 42.9 50.1 46.6 
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TABLE 8.  Simultaneous equation system between controlling shareholders’ ownership 
and debt leverage.   
The table presents the results of a simultaneous panel equations system between leverage and 
controlling shareholder ownership using 2SLS regression. The sample contains 112 French 
listed firms over the period 1998-2009. The sample contains 112 French listed firms over the 
period 1998-2009. DT_TA: ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial 
debt divide by total employed capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt 
divided by total debt and equity capital using stock market value, PERC_CAP: proportion of 
cash flow rights held by controlling shareholder, PERC_CAPSQ: squared value of PERC_CAP, 
NDTS: ratio of depreciation to total assets. EBITDA_TA: ratio of EBITDA to total assets, 
LOGTA: logarithm of the book value of total assets, RISK_EBITDA: standard deviation of 
firm’s profitability, FIXED_ASS_TA: ratio of fixed assets to total assets, MTB: market value of 
shares divided by equity book value. Sector dummy variable defined by FTSE classification are 
included into regressions but are not reported here, DT(k) for k=1,2, 3 is alternatively DT_TA, 
DT_CE and DT_CMV, INTANGIBLE_TA: ratio of intangible assets to total assets, RISK_EBIT: 
Standard deviation of EBIT considered as a proxy of operational risk for shareholders, 
MAT_DEBT: share of long term debt in the total financial debt, C_FAM: dummy for family 
ownership and control, panel is estimated using individual effect only, p-values are between 
parentheses, a, b, c indicates significance at the 1% level, 5% level and 10% level.  
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DT_TA 
 
PERC_CAP 
 
DT_CE 
 
PERC_CAP 
 
DT_CMV 
 
 
PERC_CAP 
Model S1 S2 S3 
PERC_CAP 0.2165 
(0.00)a 
 0.6959 
(0.00)a 
 0.6107 
(0.00)a 
 
PERC_CAPSQ -0.3260 
(0.00)a 
 -0.8006 
(0.00)a 
 -0.6462 
(0.00)a 
 
MTB 0.0016 
(0.02)b 
-0.0012 
(0.28) 
0.0046 
(0.00)a 
-0.0015 
(0.20) 
-0.0026 
(0.01)a 
-0.0015 
(0.20) 
LOGTA 0.0466 
(0.00)a 
-0.0082 
(0.49) 
0.1214 
(0.00)a 
-0.0010 
(0.93) 
0.1217 
(0.00)a 
-0.0013 
(0.29) 
FIXED_ASS_TA 0.1289 
(0.00)a 
 0.0679 
(0.13) 
 0.1864 
(0.00)a 
 
EBITDA_TA -0.4285 
(0.00)a 
 -0.8250 
(0.00)a 
 -0.9697 
(0.00)a 
 
NDTS 0.6129 
(0.00)a 
 0.6975 
(0.00)a 
 0.8577 
(0.00)a 
 
RISK_EBITDA -0.1944 
(0.19) 
 -0.0965 
(0.66) 
 0.0299 
(0.82) 
 
Dummy sector  Sign Sign Non 
Sign 
Sign Sign Sign 
DT(k)  -0.1669 
(0.00)a 
 -0.0773 
(0.02)b 
 -0.0127 
(0.71) 
INTANGIBLE_TA  -0.1873 
(0.00)a 
 -0.2062 
(0.00)a 
 -0.2052 
(0.00)a 
RISK_EBIT  -0.3352 
(0.06)c 
 -0.2819 
(0.12) 
 -0.3438 
(0.06)c 
MAT_DEBT  -0.0155 
(0.55) 
 -0.0137 
(0.58) 
 -0.0219 
(0.39) 
C_FAM  0.1306 
(0.00)a 
 0.1333 
(0.00)a 
 0.1340 
(0.00)a 
R2 0.17 0.18 0.25 0.19 0.33 0.19 
N 1052  1045  1050  
Inflection point 
(%) 
33.2  43.4  47.2  
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Table 9. Non-linear relationship and outside blockholders  
The table presents panel estimates of models relating debt ratios to controlling shareholders 
ownership. The sample contains 112 French listed firms over the period 1998-2009. DT_TA: 
ratio of financial debt over total assets, DT_CE: ratio of financial debt divide by total employed 
capital using book value; DT_CMV: ratio of financial debt divided by total debt and equity 
capital using stock market value, PERC_CAP: proportion of cash flow rights held by 
controlling shareholder, PERC_CAPSQ: squared value of PERC_CAP, NDTS: ratio of 
depreciation to total assets. EBITDA_TA: ratio of EBITDA to total assets, LOGTA: logarithm 
of the book value of total assets, RISK_EBITDA: standard deviation of firm’s profitability, 
FIXED_ASS_TA: ratio of fixed assets to total assets, MTB: market value of shares divided by 
equity book value, BLOC_EXT: dummy variable for the presence of an outside investor holding 
more than 10% of the capital. Sector dummy variable defined by FTSE classification are 
included into regressions but are not reported here, panel is estimated using individual effect 
only, p-values are between parentheses, a, b, c indicates significance at the 1% level, 5% level 
and 10% level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 This paper benefited from comments of J. Caby and F. Derrien. It was presented at the HEC Geneva seminar of 
Finance, at the 2007 AFFI International Finance Meeting in Paris, at the 2008 SFA Annual Conference. 
2
 These are developed mainly in the US context.  
3
 French regulation identifies 40% of voting rights as a cut-off level to presume control. 
4
 We checked using the Hausman test that random effects should be used. 
5
 Cronqvist and Nilsson (2003) document that controlling minority shareholders (CMSs) have control of a firm's 
votes while owning only a minority of the cash flow rights. p.695 
6
 Many recent studies show that controlling shareholders rely more heavily on debt financing when the deviation of 
their control rights from cash flow rights is large (Paligorova and Xu, 2009; Ellul, 2008; King and Santor, 2008; 
Manos et al., 2007; Boubaker, 2007, Bianco and Nicodono, 2006, Faccio and Lang, 2002). 
Independent variables   Dependent variable 
Model M13 M14 M15 
 DT_TA DT_CE DT_CMV 
PERC_CAP 0.2075 
(0.00)a 
0.4681 
(0.00)a 
0.4389 
(0.00)a 
PERC_CAPSQ -0.2363 
(0.00)a 
-0.5270 
(0.00)a 
-0.4849 
(0.00)a 
MTB 0.0064 
(0.00)a 
0.0137 
(0.00)a 
-0.0209 
(0.00)a 
LOGTA 0.1502 
(0.00)a 
0.1992 
(0.00)a 
0.1445 
(0.00)a 
FIXED_ASS_TA 0.1987 
(0.00)a 
0.2353 
(0.00)a 
0.1680 
(0.02)b 
EBITDA_TA -0.3525 
(0.00)a 
-0.5646 
(0.00)a 
-0.5885 
(0.00)a 
NDTS 0.2349 
(0.00)a 
0.1859 
(0.03)b 
0.2666 
(0.02)b 
RISK_EBITDA -0.0066 
(0.95) 
0.1685 
(0.32) 
-0.0688 
(0.70) 
BLOC_EXT 0.0021 
(0.95) 
-0.0254 
(0.61) 
-0.0236 
(0.54) 
Dummy sector  Sign Sign Sign 
R2 0.80 0.81 0.77 
N 873 871 871 
